Papers from a Symposium held on Tuesday, February 28, 1996
Sponsored by the Institute of Island Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island and the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Prince Edward Island Regional Group
This file has been posted electronically for your convenient reference, but it has been partially re-created through scanning and may contain errors not found in the original
In the joint creation of this publication, we have endeavoured to make the process reflect the theme -- how best to work together for the common good. The theme, of course is that always-the-bridesmaid of an idea. Maritime Union, recently in the blush of fresh attention as Canada faces severe constitutional anxieties. The process is a joint undertaking between the Institute of Island Studies at UPEI and the PEI branch of IPAC (The Institute of Public Administration of Canada). We hope this is but the first in a series of such collaborations.
This collection of papers originates from a full-day seminar held in Charlottetown on Tuesday, February 27, 1996; the topic was "Maritime Union: Is It a Good Idea for PEI" The day session was held at the Charlottetown Hotel, with the evening public debate at UPEI. In all, more than a dozen speakers gave formal presentations. Time was also allowed for questions and comments from the large and spirited crowd in attendance.
In selecting speakers for this event, we scoured the Maritimes. We required balance; and in the exploration of an idea which has been around for a long time, we sought out fresh points of view. At the end of the day, everyone went home with some new thoughts about an old concept. As Senator Brenda Robertson said, "This is but the beginning of a long and important debate for the people of the Atlantic provinces."
We originally conceived of this initiative as a public event, not as a publication; thus, we faced some logistical problems in putting together the collection. We had not asked that the speakers prepare formal papers, although some did. Others spoke from notes. These latter we asked to write summary accounts after the event. The result is rather a mixed bag, with some papers considerably longer and more detailed than others. We are satisfied though, that the variety and balance have been maintained.
In this publication, the articles appear in the order in which they were presented. We have also reproduced the seminar programme, so that readers can have a better sense of the dynamics of the debate. Those who feel the need of a short refresher course on the topic of Maritime Union may wish to begin by reading one of the later papers, the overview article by Henry Srebrnik.
The Institute of Island Studies is a research, education and public policy institute founded in 1985. As part of its four-point mandate, it is committed “to contribute to the formulation of public policy in Prince Edward Island.” To this end, the IIS has organized a number of public forums and seminars dealing with major contemporary issues such as land use, Free Trade, the GATT and the Fixed Link. It is Institute policy that no bias be shown and that all sides of controversial public issues be given equal play.
The Institute of Public Administration of Canada is a leading Canadian organization concerned with the theory and practice of public management. Its scope covers governance from the global to the local level. It is an association with 22 regional groups across the country providing networks and forums both nationally and regionally. Formed in 1947, IPAC is a private, non-profit organization. It enables public servants from all spheres of government, university and college teachers, staff and students to exchange ideas on trends, practices and innovations in public administration.
DAY-LONG SEMINAR at The Charlottetown: A Rodd Classic Hotel
9:00 a.m. Opening remarks by JOHN CROSSLEY, Vice-President of UPEI and executive member of IPAC
9:05 a.m. HON. ROBERT MORRISSEY, PEI Minister of Economic Development and Tourism, 'From Opportunity to Results: An Update and Outlook on Maritime Economic Initiatives '
9:30 a.m. Discussion
9:45 a.m. BRIAN RUSSELL, Director of the North American Policy Group, Dalhousie, and BRIAN CROWLEY, President of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIM), 'The Economics of Maritime Union: The Case For and Against'
11:00 a.m. Discussion
11:30 a.m. Break
12:00
p.m. Lunch in the Georgian Room
Introduction by ARCHIE MACFADYEN, President
of IPAC. Guest speaker JR WINTER, Wolfville economist and author on Maritime Union
1:30
p.m. Other Perspectives on Jurisdiction
DAVID MILNE, UPEI Political Studies
professor and one of Canada's leading experts on constitutional matters, 'The
Power of Jurisdiction: Provincehood and Other Alternative Models' AUBREY CORMIER,
directeur general de la Societe educative de l'I.-P.-E. et directeur-fondateur
du
Centre provincial de formation pour adultes, 'The Acadian Factor In Atlantic Political
Integration'
2:30 p.m. Discussion
2:45 p.m. Break
3:00 p.m.
KENZIE MACNEIL, editor of The Cape Bretoner, and ERIC ELLSWORTH, Chair of the
PEI Chamber of Commerce and incoming Chair of the Atlantic Provinces Chamber of
Commerce, 'A View From Two Islands'
4:00 p.m. Discussion and Summary by JOHN CROSSLEY
EVENING PUBLIC FORUM at Duffy Amphitheatre, UPEI
7:30 p.m. lAN MACDONALD, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Island Studies, will introduce HENRY SREBRNIK, Political Studies professor at UPEI, who will give a brief overview of the history of the Maritime Union question. Dr. Srebrnik will then moderate the debate.
7:45 p.m. SENATOR BRENDA ROBERTSON from New Brunswick, and ERIC ELLSWORTH, Chair of the PEI Chamber of Commerce and incoming Chair of the Atlantic Provinces Chamber of Commerce, will participate in a panel discussion with HON. MARION REID, former Speaker of the House and Lieutenant Governor of PEI, and TIM CARROLL, MLA and Business professor at UPEI, 'Maritime Union: Is It a Good Idea for PEI?'
8:45 p.m. Public Discussion
Moving Forward on Maritime Union: Drowning Out the Partitionists1 Lament
Political and economic Union of the four Atlantic provinces2
is a topic with a long and difficult history. It has been debated by scholars,
politicians, journalists and citizens at great length, as long ago as pre-Confederation
and as recently as the 1970s, when the Deutsch Commission was appointed to examine
the topic and issued its aborted recommendation in favour of Union. Some might
argue that it is an idea which has been buried and reburied in the region and
should not now be disinterred. To accept such an argument would be wrong. Indeed,
the very resilience of the idea recommends it.
It is particularly timely
that the idea should reassert itself now, for the economic world in which we live
demands it. Increasing integration of international economies through free trade
agreements, new technologies and international institutions means that no region
can shelter itself from the forces of the broader world. Atlantic Canada is inexorably
and irretrievably a part of the global economy, and for this it is better off.
Being
part of the global economy creates both opportunities and challenges for this
region. New external forces and actors influence our daily lives and our economic
well-being. New markets open up to Atlantic Canadian products and services. These
forces require that we respond from a position of strength. Division and infighting
are counterproductive and foolhardy. As one example, a recent study by the North
American Policy Group at Dalhousie University has indicated that while Atlantic
Canada has benefited from new opportunities created by free trade, it has done
so far less substantially than the rest of Canada. Lack of government policy co-ordination
and stretched provincial resources are no doubt one reason for this laggard performance.
In
order to seize our economic opportunities, Atlantic Canadians must fundamentally
rethink the way in which this region governs itself and conducts its economic
affairs. In so doing no strategy recommends itself more highly than the combination
of our resources into a single political and economic entity which represents
the region to the world beyond its borders in a credible and forward-looking manner.
This, then, is the principal argument for Union; it allows the region to maximize
its strengths and minimize its weaknesses in the world in which we live today.
The economic future, and hence the prosperity of this region, does not lie in
looking inward and focusing on our internal provincial interests and division,
but rather in facing outward with a common goal and a plan for achieving it. Only
Union can fully achieve this result.
This is not the only reason to recommend
unity. Elimination of duplication and regulatory inconsistency, smaller and more
efficient government, removal of trade barriers—all of these economic advantages
could ensue from Union. Are these changes needed? A 1994 survey of its Atlantic
membership by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business found consistent
support from 60-70 per cent of its members for greater integration of economic
activity. Public opinion polling in all four provinces has repeatedly found majority
support for some form of Union. Why, then, has nothing happened?
The political
leadership of the region has never been particularly supportive of the concept
of Union and in many cases has been openly hostile. Why? Aside from the obvious
vested interest of provincial politicians in continuing to provide themselves
with employment and pensions from the public purse, it is difficult to discover
a sensible answer. Atlantic Canada has a total population of almost 2.5 million
persons; its GDP represents 6-7 per cent of the Canadian total. This region as
an economic and political unit would approach Alberta in terms of its importance
in the federation. As four single provinces, none of which has a population of
one million, or much more than 2 per cent of the national GDP, regional voices
are frequently divided, discordant, timid and unheard. While Ottawa's importance
to the region will undoubtedly decline as a result of budget cuts and the "downloading"
of responsibilities, it will continue to be an important focal point for Atlantic
influence.
Equally important, as resources from Ottawa decline and provincial
responsibilities grow, it will be crucial to pool our resources and govern ourselves
from strength, while promoting increased regional self-sufficiency. Further justification
is found in the precarious question of national unity. A unified region constitutes
an important part of the plan for dealing with the current discontent in the federation
and the possible isolation in the region should a future Quebec independence referendum
succeed. Reacting after the fact will be too late. Those who advocate delay are
engaging in a high-stakes gamble with our future.
As a single unit espousing
a single set of policy positions, the region stands its best chance of well-representing
its interest both nationally and abroad. Indeed, the argument for Union is so
compelling as to be almost overwhelming. Yet still can be heard the cry of the
partitionist in the land. “We must not have Union. We cannot have Union.”
What are his arguments? Why would anyone support such a negative and self-defeating
position?
First, the partitionist will respond that Union is not necessary
because sufficient co-operation already occurs, and, perhaps, on some constitutional
issues, it does. But how many bureaucratic and political person-hours are wasted
achieving that co-operation? Political Union eliminates the need for this wasted
effort. Indeed, a similar argument can be made with respect to those few non-constitutional
areas where the provinces have managed to achieve some inter-provincial co-operation.
What about these areas?
The Maritime Procurement Agreement is frequently
touted as the stellar example of such success. Yet, in a Union, no taxpayer dollars
need be spent negotiating, arguing about and enforcing such an agreement because
government procurement would be unified de facto. It is to be strongly suspected
that the savings achieved from eliminating this type of bureaucratic and political
time-wasting from trying to "co-ordinate" four policy sets and four
political agendas would far exceed any of the supposed costs of Union, which in
any event would be one-time, up-front, and far outweighed by benefits over eternity.
Seen in this light, even the "golden children- of co-operation reveal themselves
as far inferior to Union.
The sensible course of Union has been scuttled
on the rocks of "co-operation" for at least the last twenty-five years.
The Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP), the most notable attempt to divert the
call for union advocated by the Deutsch Commission, has been a thin-reed attempt
to appear to make progress on issues where few have been willing to agree on specifics.
As a result of this lack of progress, the CMP has been consistently marginalized
by conflicting political agendas among the provinces. Its existence, let alone
its modest accomplishments over the past three decades, is known to few beyond
the Council itself and has very little effect on the life or the problems of the
average citizen. It is a failed experiment which resists the compelling logic
of its existence: if co-operation amongst four provinces to achieve unified positions
is economically necessary and good, then merger and unity are per force better.
We
cease to be distracted by "co-operation" and focus directly on the objectives
which it seeks to achieve. These goals are all best achieved by unity.
Some
partitionists will also lament the loss of competition between the provinces as
a force for greater efficiency. Indeed, it is correct to advocate the cause of
healthy policy competition between jurisdictions as a brake on the tendency of
government to tax and spend inefficiently. Partitionists point to the example
of municipal amalgamations, which they argue have often not gone well. Clearly
there are lessons to be learned and pitfalls to be avoided, but more fundamentally,
it is wrong to equate provincial units with municipal ones. Provincial governments
are held up to a higher level of public scrutiny than their municipal counterparts.
Many of the problems which have emerge with some amalgamations would never occur
in the glare of regional, national and even international attention focused on
political union.
The partitionists ignore the fundamental reality that
competition for Atlantic Canadian Government is now manifestly coming from outside
the region. Further, competition between the provinces has often been destructive.
For example, Atlantic governments consume much-needed resources when they compete
with each other to attract business through various subsidies. One need only look
to the recent past for examples.
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In the global economy, Atlantic provinces
compete with other Canadian jurisdictions, U.S. states and countries around the
world to develop and implement the most efficient public policies to create a
favourable economic climate and promote investment and growth. The current situation
is a akin to a baseball team that decides that a series of pitching duels between
its own best pitchers is the best strategy to pick a starter against its real
opposition in the league. Unfortunately, what emerges is one tired, weak-armed
pitcher. This is the reality of Atlantic Canada today, four strong pitchers wasting
their best fastballs against each other while the real competition relaxes and
awaits the spent winner. Any discussion of competition within the region cannot
ignore these facts. Nor should it ignore the fact that there is an optimal size
which jurisdictions must obtain in order to be efficient actors in the global
market. In the geographic, economic and political circumstances of Atlantic Canada,
no one province is as efficient in economic terms of scale and scope as a combined
province would be.
What of the lot of the smallest provinces? Would not
the advances of jurisdiction and provincehood outweigh any perceived gains from
Union? In a word, no. Jurisdiction is a shibboleth constructed by partitionists
which attempts to frighten citizens from enhancing their quality of life. The
very purpose of jurisdiction is to create a political entity which best ensures
the well-being of citizens. In the case of Atlantic Canada, such an entity is
region-wide. It is not only historical anachronism which binds us to our current
political boundaries; they are neither immalleable nor sacrosanct. Each current
province could maintain its federal representation within a larger Union. Again,
the anti-unionist is distracted from his true goal, enhanced quality of life,
by an attachment to system, regional partition, which does not best serve anyone's
interests.
There is much evidence that would suggest small economies do
better as units of larger ones. In Europe, which is in many respects a political
as well as economic Union, two of the best performing economies have been those
of Ireland and Luxembourg, two small states able successfully to leverage their
own considerable resources as part of a larger entity.
Since joining the
European Union, Ireland has moved from under-performing the OECD average growth
rate by .5 per cent to outperforming it by 1.4 per cent between 1974 and 1990.
In fact, Ireland has been the fastest growing economy in the European Union for
the last five consecutive years. Similar results have been obtained by Luxembourg.
Smaller economies should be mightily encouraged by these examples. Common economic
policies and considerable political amalgamation have made this possible. Full
Union would have produced even better results. Only a central political authority
can ever hope to achieve similar results in Atlantic Canada, a thesis which is
borne out by the CMP experience noted previously.
Lastly, the ardent partitionist
will decry the loss of provincial culture that he is sure will occur as a result
of Union. To this suggestion the only appropriate response is "rubbish,"
or some stronger variant. Culture in this region is vibrant and booming. Union
would not weaken it but enhance it, both through opening up new export opportunities
and through making sure that its encouragement becomes even more central to our
lives. Again, countless examples show the fallacy of the partitionist claim. Surely
no one would suggest that the Irish are any less Irish for their membership in
the EU. In fact, Irish culture is not only thriving but is being avidly sought
out around the world. Union would strengthen our various cultures and develop
new sources of revenue which could be channeled into still further development.
Clearly,
the argument for Union is strong. However, I am not speaking of a Union which
merely combines the four provinces and duplicates existing institutions. The lead-up
to union should be viewed as an opportunity to review every aspect of the way
in which we govern ourselves in this region. Innovative and new methods of elections,
administration, governance and policy-making should be explored and adopted where
appropriate. The region should lead in creating a government structure which responds
to the wishes of its citizens and the changing nature of life in the 21st century.
A single province will have vastly underachieved its potential if it is allowed
to be a simple merger of existing institutions.
A new Atlantic province
must be designed to serve its citizens for the next hundred years. We must be
no less visionary than our predecessors who overcame their narrow interests in
Charlottetown over a century ago. We must seek acceptable arrangements with our
minority populations and protect the rights of Acadian communities. We must create
a government that is responsive to the needs of its citizens and a wise steward
of its resources; which is a tough international competitor and is also compassionate
to those truly in need. This region has available the single most important resource
to achieve these objectives, the people. United in a common purpose, those people
can achieve long-term prosperity. Atlantic Union is an important step in taking
control of our own destiny and moving forward toward our goals.
1.Throughout
this paper I refer to the supporters of the political status quo as partitionists.
I believe that their position supports an unnatural division of the region which
defies economics, logic and common sense.
2.I speak here of Atlantic Union,
as I believe it is the most efficient and logical outcome. Indeed, I believe all
four provinces would benefit greatly from their merger. I note, however, for the
record, that in the event that citizens of any single province are fundamentally
opposed to Union, I would continue to be in favour of the Union of the remaining
three.
BRIAN
LEE CROWLEY
Atlantic Union, Maritime Union: Will It Cure What Ails Us?
In
the aftermath of the Quebec referendum, many people in Atlantic Canada feel uncertain
and vulnerable. Trends we have traditionally feared are speeding up, trends like
deepening uncertainty about Quebec's place in Canada, growing pressures for decentralization
and faltering national support for many kinds of transfer programs that we have
come to depend on.
If one judges by the media and declarations by our politicians,
the venerable old idea of Maritime (or even Atlantic) Union should be at the top
of our list of responses to our growing angst. But would political Union of the
provinces actually help solve any of the very real problems the region faces?
In
the 1860s, when Maritime Union was first put seriously on the public agenda, it
might have made sense. But that was an era with little experience of modem government.
In the 1990s, Maritime Union is almost certainly not the right answer. That is
because the idea of Union is based in part on misconceptions about what makes
for efficiency in government and in part on the old culture of dependence on government,
a desire for more clout in Ottawa.
Why Maritime Union?
Several
reasons seem to drive those who favour union. Without question, the first in importance
is the notion that we have too much “overlap and duplication.” Surely
it stands to reason that having only one capital, one cabinet and one set of deputy
ministers would be cheaper. If this were true, it would be a good reason for promoting
Union. Unfortunately, this reasoning does not stand up.
There is no denying
the seductiveness of the idea that having only one provincial government in the
region would mean cheaper, more efficient government. These alleged economies
of scale are often being touted by business people who want government run more
like a business, and see waste and duplication everywhere. But as Gordon Tullock,
a prominent economist, has argued in his most recent book, The New Federalist,
“There is much more centralization in governments than in the economy. This
is in spite of the fact that there do not seem to be any very obvious economies
of scale outside of a few very special areas like the military and, possibly,
diplomacy.”
Tullock, of course, is drawing our attention to the fact
that in both government and the economy, big and small organizations exist, and
both can be efficient in those things where they enjoy advantages. But being large
in itself is no guarantee of anything.
Big Versus Efficient
In
fact, there are good reasons for thinking that bigger government will be less
efficient and responsive, not more. To see why, it helps to think, not in terms
of governments, but of private companies. It would make no sense to say, for example,
that we have "too many" supermarkets and that everything would be much
cheaper if there were only one supermarket chain. One could be misled, of course,
by looking at superficial things like the elimination of several CEOs, and the
fact that each town might now have one big store instead of several smaller ones.
Consumers might dream about the economies of scale in transport, warehousing and
marketing that could be achieved.
In practice, of course, such large monopolies,
freed from the discipline of competition, would provide no such saving. On the
contrary, they tend to use their powerful position to raise prices, produce shoddy
goods and ignore the wishes of their customers. The entire economy of the former
Soviet Union was built on the illusion that competition was wasteful and that
large public-sector monopolies were therefore the most efficient form of organization.
While not a monopoly, giant IBM achieved such a size and sense of misplaced self-importance
that it thought it could ignore its customers. That opened the door to a whole
series of much smaller but more dynamic competitors to elbow the sleepy giant
aside.
Too Much Government, Not Too Many Governments
In fact,
most of the hard economic evidence on the public sector shows that this need for
the discipline of competition applies there just as much as it does in private
industry. Bob Bish, for example, in The Public Economies of Metropolitan Areas,
was able to show convincingly more than twenty years ago why promised savings
and efficiencies from metropolitan amalgamations have regularly failed to materialize.
The reason was that having a single metropolitan government simply insulated that
government from competitive pressures to improve its performance.
In the
United Kingdom, the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1986 eliminated
any central government at all in one of Europe's largest cities. The resulting
fragmentation has, according to The Economist, been a “source of strength
rather than weakness.” Andrew Sanction, in his Governing Canada's City Regions,
concluded just two years ago that the most efficient urban arrangement in Canada
was the Greater Vancouver Regional District, which covered many municipalities
that pool authority and resources when it makes sense, and that remain autonomous
where it is more efficient.
In each of these cases, what has been shown
to work sounds rather like the structure of Atlantic and Maritime co-operation
that already exists and that could and should be carrying more responsibility.
It sounds, for instance, like the Atlantic Procurement Agreement. This negotiated
pact allows private business in each of the provinces access to the public-sector
procurement market in the other provinces and makes them more efficient, while
saving taxpayers money. This agreement is actually superior in some respects to
the national Internal Trade Agreement. Responsibilities, however, need to be region-wide
only when there are genuine savings or demonstrable efficiencies to be realized,
or where problems are regional in nature, as in some environmental areas. Such
appropriate areas of co-operation are best discovered and dealt with on a case-by-case
basis, and not by an indiscriminate political Union.
Power of Choice
Think
about those forces that bring pressure to bear on the governments in this region
to improve their performance, whether in terms of tax load, administrative efficiency
or fiscal responsibility. The most powerful are when people make comparisons with
what is going on in the province next door, and when the provinces have to face
dwindling resources with which to work. If we can harness these forces more creatively,
they will produce far-reaching and positive results. If we take the route of union,
we risk sliding even deeper into public-sector inefficiency.
What brings
efficiency in the private sector is not size, but the constant awareness that
a failure to meet the standards established by competitors means the loss of business
and, eventually, of livelihood. The driving force here, then, is the freedom of
consumers to make comparisons and to seek the supplier that best meets their needs.
When
it became clear that Nova Scotia businesses were seriously considering moving
to New Brunswick because Workers’ Compensation premiums were out of control,
this brought prompt remedial action from Nova Scotia. But this only works when
taxpayers and businesses can vote with their feet, and when they can hold up the
performance of other jurisdictions as a benchmark for their own. Let us not forget
that the Nova Scotia government tried to call foul, because New Brunswick was
making Nova Scotia businesses aware of the lower costs of doing certain kinds
of business in that province. Yet this is economically valuable information; if
we want an efficient economy, it requires businesses to set up shop in those jurisdictions
where they get the best value for their tax dollar, just as they shop for the
best supplier of the other goods and services they use. Public-sector competition,
like private-sector competition, "is not wasteful, but is a healthy discipline
that promotes efficiency.
The Influence Argument
Proponents
of Union usually buttress their efficiency argument with a political one. Union
would, they say, create a bigger population represented by one voice. This would
increase our political clout in Ottawa and hence be in our economic interest.
Again, however, this conventional thinking has been overtaken by events.
Put
simply, Ottawa no longer has the means to be the fount of largesse that it once
was. Even if Union would increase our political weight—and that in itself
is highly questionable—influence in Ottawa is going to be less and less useful
in the economic world of tomorrow. Ottawa's fiscal problems continue to be far
more serious than those of this region's provinces.
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We all know that Ottawa
is going to cut back, but very few people understand the scale of what is to come.
Startling as it may sound, if we wanted to bring the federal budget into balance
by the year 2000 we would have to eliminate all transfers to the provinces except
equalization. And that's after having cut the federal government's own operational
spending by 50 per cent and making some very reasonable assumptions about Canada's
economic performance. So seeking more influence in Ottawa as the best way to protect
our economic interests is to miss the point. It is like trying to influence the
course of the French Revolution by being named to the French aristocracy. The
old reflex of looking to Ottawa to solve our problems only distracts us from the
one strategy that promises worthwhile results. That strategy is to reduce our
dependence now and to become more self-reliant. The one kind of prosperity that
no one can take away from us is the kind we generate by making goods and services
that people want to buy and then selling them around the world.
Union, then, is not the answer for those who are looking for the mechanisms to help this region achieve better public sector efficiency and an improved ability to confront the challenges looming on the horizon. This is no counsel of despair, however. Now we can look forward and identify some strategies that will help us to achieve the self-reliance and public-sector effectiveness that we need to succeed.
Behold How Good and Pleasant It Is for Brethren to Dwell in Unity
I have taken the above quotation from Psalm 133 as the text
for my sermon today for several reasons, not the least of which is that it was
the foreword to Chapter One of my Report on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations
for the Maritime Union Study in 1970. To be honest, I had hardly looked at it
since, until the Institute of Island Studies kindly invited me to this seminar
as one of the Principals of that Study—mainly, one suspects, because most
of the other participants are now either dead or incontinent. In the event, I
was so taken by the brilliance of my analysis that I felt compelled to share it
with you today. My text is an obvious platitude which makes us feel all warm inside,
but the point to be made is that popular support for a political union has to
be primarily emotional, a matter of faith built on myths and truisms.
Nowhere
is this more evident today than in the debate over Canadian unity. Federalists
have not been able to provide Quebec Francophones with emotionally positive reasons
for staying in Canada because there are none, and there are none because we as
Canadians have not nurtured our national myths and truisms for some forty years
or more. Yet the Separatists have brilliantly created, emotionally charged, negative
reasons, albeit based on a distorted and self-serving view of history. Which is
why Trudeau's recent accusations are significant, and why Bouchard has ridiculed
Trudeau rather than dealing with the factual basis of the historical events in
question. By the same token, the Separatists lose their cool over the partition
of Quebec because their mythology has no rationalization for the present boundaries
of Quebec. It is their Achilles heel and they know it.
At the same time,
negative reasons for Canadian unity based on the economic costs of separation
are not only irrelevant to most Quebecers but are largely incorrect. Does anyone
really think that the day after a sovereign Quebec is declared there will be any
fewer mineral ores in that province, fewer forests, fewer factories, fewer farmers,
fewer scientists, fewer anything that would make Quebec significantly worse-off
in terms of real economic resources? Of course not. Even federal transfer payments
would take years to wind down. There would be winners and losers and though the
economy of Quebec would develop along different lines, with essentially the same
real resources, who is to say it would be less prosperous, other than the losers?
The point I am trying to make is that the real economic concerns are not always
reflected in financial accounts, Paul Martin and other finance ministers to the
contrary.
I refer to these national issues since they are very much in
our minds these days and because roughly the same factors that apply to a federation
in disarray will also apply to the formation of a Maritime Union. Then, as you
may well ask, if it is more a matter of political make-believe than economics,
why would an economist like myself be asked to report on the desirability of such
a proposal? Even Jacques Parizeau before his “road to Damascus” conversion
turned him into a Separatist had said:
... to define the meaning of a federation in terms of economic theory is more difficult; it is downright impossible.
And yet, as I think back to the principal researchers
of the Maritime Union Study, we were nearly all economists, beginning with the
Chairman John Deutsch and Executive Director Fred Drummie and thereon down.
There
were three reasons for this anomaly. First, there wasn't, and still isn't, any
discernible cultural or ethnic imperative for Union amongst the three Maritime
Provinces. Second, though Parizeau was correct in that there is not a satisfactory
economic model to explain either political Union or disunion, in a democracy the
economic implications for various groups will largely determine political attitudes
toward such initiatives. Trudeau, not known for economic common sense, stated
that even Confederation was “... born of a decision by pragmatic politicians
to face facts, as they are... an attempt to find a rational compromise between
the divergent interest groups which history has thrown together.” As if it
depends on whose ox is being gored ....
Last, and most important, I suggest
the Maritime Union Study was intended to create a mythology to support the faith
of Maritimers in Union. At the time, the all-pervasive vision of government policy
was self-sustaining economic development -- remember the Prince Edward Island
Development Plan? Further, the prevailing wisdom was that to achieve this, the
Region needed more control over its own destiny, which realistically could only
be done through Maritime Union overcoming the parochial attitudes and petty patronage
of the existing provincial governments, much of which is reflected, with some
obvious exceptions, in jovial but nonetheless incompetent bureaucracies. It is
worthwhile noting that one of the priorities of the Silent Revolution in Quebec
was to build up a civil service in the sixties that was superior to Ontario and
in the same league as Ottawa.
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But let us go back to the beginning. In the
1850s, various governors of the three colonies had broached the matter of Maritime
Union without igniting any enthusiasm. This was revived in 1864 as a reaction
to the abandonment of the intercolonial railway scheme, although the planned conference
would likely have been abandoned were it not for the intervention of Upper and
Lower Canada which had their own agenda. The Prime Minister and Provincial Premiers
meeting in Charlottetown, held a hundred years later to commemorate the event
with the opening of the Confederation Centre, featured short speeches from each
leader. Premier Robichaud of New Brunswick rather diffidently asked if the Maritime
Union discussions of 1864 should not be completed.
Much to his surprise,
his suggestion was enthusiastically endorsed by the other premiers—whether
out of nostalgia or boredom is not clear. In the event, the idea was also seized
upon by Ottawa, primarily one suspects, because the federal politicians and bureaucrats
preferred to deal with a single substantial political entity rather than the three
minor nuisances. The appointment of John Deutsch, Principal of the establishment
Queen's University and long-time highly respected federal mandarin, to head up
the study, plus a substantial cash investment in the exercise, confirmed Ottawa's
commitment. Buoyed by such external support. Resolutions of Intent were passed
unanimously in the Houses of Assembly of both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick during
February 1965, and the same was promised for Prince Edward Island in the Throne
Speech in 1968. However, before this could be done, and with the financial support
from Ottawa already in place, the three premiers made statements in their respective
Houses on March 27th, 1968, declaring the formation of the Maritime Union Study.
The
only thing lacking was a groundswell of support from the people of the Region.
In regard to the regional newspapers, the Moncton Daily Times was consistently
in favour but the Fredericton Daily Gleaner and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald were
the opposite. The Charlottetown Guardian swung in the wind but its editorial comment
in October 1968 suggests a fundamental distaste for Maritime Union:
The hoary proposal for a political merger in which we would stand to lose much more than we gained does not appeal to Prince Edward Islanders. Our hope is, indeed, that concentration on the broader aspects of the problems will serve to lay the tired ghost of that issue indefinitely.
Obviously it didn't or
we wouldn't be here today. Overall, the editorial consensus in the Maritimes was
for close co-operation but without political Union.
However, outside the
region it was seen as the only sensible solution, for as the Globe and Mail editorialized:
Union is an essential part of the foundation for eventual prosperity. Three of the poorest and smallest provinces cannot afford three separate provincial administrations.
Given
that attitude, I believe our failure to implement Maritime Union has hastened
the erosion of sympathy and good will towards this region in the rest of Canada,
which has since virtually excluded consideration of our perilous position in the
current national unity debate. To anticipate, let me say that undertaking Maritime
Union today wouldn't make much of a difference in this regard, now that the demons
of decentralization are abroad in the land.
Meanwhile, the public seemed
to be more attuned to the virtues of brethren dwelling “together in unity,”
as opinion polling indicated almost two-thirds of the population in favour of
Maritime Union; moreover they weren't concerned whether the costs were borne by
the federal government or not. One has to believe that this support was, as they
say, “soft.” More important was that the one-quarter opposed was hard
core, the great majority of them against any form of Union, political or otherwise—especially
those in Nova Scotia. As Maritime Union didn't happen, it might seem that this
hard core had won, but I argue it was rather because the Trudeau government was
too preoccupied with Quebec.
Ironically, when the final report of the
Maritime Union Study came out on Friday, November 27, 1970, it had already been
delayed a month by the FLQ crisis in Quebec and, in particular, the discovery
of the murdered body of Pierre Laporte on October 18. However, we participants
had done our job, for our analysis pointed unerringly towards Maritime Union,
although the wording was rather circuitous:
If the people of the Maritimes decide that they wish to reverse the trends of the past, and develop conditions which would bring more adequate opportunities in the region on the basis of self-determined objectives, it will be necessary to establish immediately a method of co-operation which would envisage the attainment of full political union as a definite goal.
To achieve this, the Report identified
as necessary and sufficient the creation of appropriate institutions, strong leadership,
and federal support. For one reason or another none of these conditions was met.
About the only relevant institution to emerge was the Council of Maritime
Premiers, and that was a defensive gambit designed to avoid political union. Moreover,
the official response was itself less than reassuring when all three Premiers
damned the Report with faint praise. This was hardly surprising since Regan of
Nova Scotia and Hatfield of New Brunswick had both just come to power within the
previous month and the Maritime Union Study had been the creation of their political
oppositions. While Premier Campbell had been consistently supportive, his predecessor
had initiated it and his province was least in favour.
Although the media provided abundant coverage on the release of the Report, it was short lived and less than encouraging. Consider the Halifax Chronical-Herald which carried a Chambers cartoon on depicted Nova Scotia taxpayer carrying on his back Deuterium Limited playing a Clairtone radio, but on top of elephant of Maritime preferential shipping policies for New Brunswick topped by a sun bathing “Spud Islanders.” By Monday the Herald was quoting Nova Scotia Conservative M.P. Bob Coates as complaining that merely seeking political Union “could set back the cause of regional co-operation," and on Tuesday former New Brunswick Premier Hugh John Fleming opined that without even reading the Report he was opposed to Maritime Union because it had not occurred back in 1864. By Wednesday there was no mention of the Report whatsoever in the columns of the paper. So much for public opinion.
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What
about federal government support? My own Report suggested that a “special
grant of two billion dollars in equal installments over ten years” from the
federal government to offset the costs of transition would ensure Maritime Union,
citing the case of Newfoundland’s entry into Canada, but this was never acted
upon. Not that Ottawa was miserly—far from it—for it dispensed triple
that amount during the succeeding ten years over and above what the Maritime Provinces
would have received based on the then current trends. During the seventies, provincial
governments in this region had difficulty thinking up ways to spend all the transfer
payments they were receiving. In fact, the federal government's generosity discouraged
Maritime Union because the money was arriving without any real commitment to accountability,
much less substantive political change.
The reason for this was simply
that the Trudeau government was intent on
pouring
money into Quebec, and to do so it established numerous programs from which the
stopovers rained down on this region like manna from heaven. The evidence is pretty
clear if we look at net federal spending in Quebec and how it increased both at
the time of the FLQ crisis in 1970 and the referendum of 1980, and how this was
paralleled for the Maritime Provinces. Eventually all provinces caught on and
started cashing in on Ottawa's largesse.
Whereas originally it was a zero
sum game of transferring wealth from the haves to the have-nots, it soon became
a matter of trying to make everybody richer in the present and this meant borrowing
against the future. Thus, starting in the seventies, we ended up with the massive
federal government deficits courtesy of Trudeau's belief that he could buy Quebec's
allegiance to Canada.
In 1970, Trudeau could have bought our allegiance
to Maritime Union instead. This may sound crass and materialistic, but the fact
is that precipitate changes in political institutions impose substantial economic
costs. Some are immediate, such as those arising from the relocation of government
operations leading to new facilities and employee buy-outs; nor is it clear that
even these minimal amounts would be offset by long-run gains in efficiency. Others
are indirect, such as the costs to government suppliers who have invested in plant,
equipment,
staff, technology, and reputation on the expectation of continuing contracts,
to say nothing of those who are dependent on the many varieties of patronage Maritimers
have managed to invent. These would all be greater in this region where government
plays a significantly more important role in the economy than elsewhere in Canada.
Lastly, there are the psychological costs of destroying traditions and symbols,
the disappearance of ways of life to which people have become accustomed. This
is especially true for Prince Edward Island, of course.
Obviously, change
would also mean winners who profit from the new opportunities and challenges --
whether based on merit or patronage doesn't matter since they are not likely to
agree to reimburse the losers in any case. Therefore, the political opposition
of potential losers from Maritime Union can only be overcome by external economic
factors. Needless to say at the present time Ottawa is neither able nor willing
to underwrite such things—indeed they are in the process of cutting back
federal transfers to this region; for example UI benefits for seasonal workers.
Otherwise, I can only foresee the separation of Quebec with its present
borders having enough economic impact to force this region to embrace Union, and
although an independent Quebec is very possible, I suggest it would necessarily
involve partition. Much would depend on the specific configuration of the new
Canada as to the effect on the Maritime provinces.
Let me be clear about
my own position. I anticipate that in the long run, say in thirty years or so,
Maritime Union will inevitably occur as the result of radically different methods
of governing everywhere else in the world, arising from change in information
and communications technology which we will not be able to control. In much the
same way that as individuals we have not been able to resist VCRs, automatic banking
machines, and health foods, whether we wanted to or not. But that is a whole other
story.
BARRY BARTMANN AND DAVID MILNE
The Power of Jurisdiction: Provincehood and Other Alternative Models
Is Prince Edward Island really a “toy
province,” a Ruritanian theme park in the Canadian federation? Is it simply
an absurd anomaly, an historical accident, an affectionate piece of Confederation
memorabilia? This is regrettably the frequently bemused and incredulous view of
Prince Edward Island from Toronto and even from Calgary. Skeptics there ask whether
we can really afford to carry such expensive jurisdictional anomalies into the
next century and whether such seemingly pathetic little places can possibly survive
in the new international economy.
In this metropolitan view, the following
propositions are advanced almost as articles of faith or as truisms: smallness
means weakness, lack of power and influence, whereas consolidation and rationalization
are the essential logic of our time. Integration alone holds promise in savings
from culling jurisdictions and reallocating resources, and in providing a sound
and rational foundation for “good government.” And if this logic of
rationalization is being so ruthlessly applied to much larger communities in Ontario
and elsewhere, why should Prince Edward Island be able to call upon its status
of provincehood to resist? While admittedly some Canadians are prepared to defend
this Island's status as a generous and defensible case of diversity in our federation,
many see only exasperation at the apparent unfairness and irrationality of it
all and feel compelled to put it right: to restore the logic of economies of scale.
Even national commentators who, year after year, summer on the Island, and who
speak glowingly of its special charms, still remind us that Prince Edward Island's
three counties might be better served within the context of a larger and more
“rational” provincial jurisdiction. From the clouded office towers of
Toronto and the stuffy committee rooms of Ottawa, Prince Edward Island might indeed
seem a quaint little place where almost everything is replicated in delicate miniature.
Well,
how should Islanders respond? We might begin by insisting that size is, after
all, relative, and that what looks like "rational" size depends very
much on our starting point or place. Rational size seen from the context of mainland
U.S. or Canada looks different than from other starting points. It is true that
Prince Edward Island is the smallest jurisdiction in mainland North America—one-quarter
the size of the smallest states in the American union: Vermont, Delaware, Alaska
and North Dakota, and one-eighth the size of Rhode Island. Yet, from a more inclusive
definition of our continent, we see six island states, wholly sovereign, with
populations comparable to that of Prince Edward Island: Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts,
Saint Vincent, Grenada, Dominica and Antigua. And there are, of course, many more
self-governing and financially independent jurisdictions in our hemisphere with
populations smaller than Newfoundland and with jurisdictional powers comparable
to that of provinces in our federation.
Seen from elsewhere in the world,
Prince Edward Island's size and status are far from out of the ordinary. From
a European perspective, four sovereign states arise with populations less than
that of Prince Edward Island, and eight with populations less than Newfoundland.
Moreover, there are many home rule or self-governing territories in Europe with
populations much smaller than Prince Edward Island, all but two of which are self-sufficient.
One wonders how Liechtenstein, or Luxembourg, or San Marino, or the Isle of Man,
or the Aland Islands, or Iceland, or Monaco, Andorra, the Channel islands, Gibraltar
and Malta or Cypress would fare if this rationalist logic from Toronto and Calgary
were to be applied to them? The answer is obvious: in stripping these small communities
of their jurisdiction (and their confidence), we would have taken away their power
to speak and represent themselves with international corporations, other governments,
and with intergovernmental agencies of funding. We would have removed their "green
cards" with which they discuss, define and negotiate their own niches in
what is now a highly competitive and hugely integrated global economy.
For
such is the heart of our message: jurisdictional status itself should be seen
as a resource -- indeed as the most important resource a community can have. As
such, it can never be sensibly separated from the question of exploiting opportunities
for economic development, nor from the larger social and cultural development
of a community. In short, jurisdictional status is about who speaks for a society,
with what authority and in what important theatres of action.
Now Maritime
Union engages this issue frontally when it proposes that Prince Edward Island
(and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) once and for all cede their provincial status
to speak and act for themselves. The question is: what do we really give up with
provincehood? how important is it? Contrary to Unionists' claims, it is far from
a trivial step. Provincehood in our decentralized Canadian federation is a status
more powerful than that enjoyed by state governments in the U.S., and more powerful
than the Australian states or the German Lander. Indeed, provincehood, when taken
to its limits as Quebec has done, is a status unequalled among subnational jurisdictions
in the world.
Consider the formal powers of provincehood: direct taxation
(income and corporation taxes); health and social policy; education; municipalities;
the administration of justice; management and sale of public lands within the
province; large natural resource powers over land and land use, including the
exploration, development, conservation, export within Canada of non-renewable
natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy; and even, with the
Atlantic Accord, power over seabeds adjacent to the province, including the right
to share management rights to explore and exploit the land under the sea adjacent
to the province and to apply royalties and taxes "as if these resources were
on land within the province." Moreover, provinces enjoy wide powers to regulate
the provincial economy, to incorporate companies, and to make law over the whole
immense field of “property and civil rights.” There are concurrent powers,
too (powers shared with Ottawa) -- over agriculture, immigration and contributory
pensions. Provinces even have the power to represent themselves internationally,
and to implement Canadian treaties where the subject matter is in their jurisdiction.
Most provinces have many quasi-diplomatic trade offices abroad, with Quebec's
offices in Paris being the most prominent. And, as Canadians have no doubt noted
increasingly in recent years, provincial leaders go hand in hand with the federal
Prime Minister on international trade junkets, to meet foreign leaders and companies,
and to negotiate deals for their own companies and peoples. These are crucial
powers in our kind of international economy where success or failure for global
enterprises depends heavily upon achieving privileged access to private and public
decision-makers. It is for this reason that there has been a tremendous explosion
in subnational international activities abroad by all levels of government, including
city and regional government.
Powers of provincehood, of course, extend
far beyond formal legal powers to include powerful conventions and practices:
a seat at the table at First Ministers conferences; rights to intergovernmental
financial transfers, including equalization payments, and health, education, and
social assistance transfers; rights to representation in the federal cabinet;
consultation on judicial appointments and other senior appointments in the province;
regular access to the Prime Minister, and to other key federal decision-makers;
and access to and attention from the media. We might ask what jurisdiction in
its right mind would trade these and other vital resources now in hand for the
vague promises of a fast-talking unionist salesman?
Now, it is true that
the Atlantic provinces may not as yet have used these powerful jurisdictional
resources as effectively as they might to achieve greater self-reliance. But New
Brunswick has been certainly showing the way recently. In any event, the federal
government is now vacating much of the field to the provinces in an unprecedented
retrenchment driven by unmanageable debt and deficits. While this withdrawal in
the short term gravely threatens dependent provinces such as Prince Edward Island,
it is also an opportunity for the province to wean itself from this dependency
and to chart a self-reliant course as other small jurisdictions have done elsewhere.
Consider,
for example, the case of Liechtenstein. In the 1950s this was a quiet little pastoral
Alpine community. Its livelihood was based on agriculture, including a variety
of rich dairy products. It was largely unknown in international affairs; indeed,
whatever representations the principality may have offered were conducted through
the good offices of its Swiss neighbours. But successive governments in Liechtenstein
soon came to appreciate the value of the principality's separate jurisdictional
status. First in tourism and international philately, then in financial services
and banking, Liechtenstein marshaled a full range of incentives in the development
of a modern diversified economy.
Success was most dramatic in the growth
of high-value industries: precision instruments, dental equipment, pharmaceuticals,
food processing, electronics, metal products, ultra-high vacuum technology, ceramics,
pre-fabricated houses and even protective coatings for spacecraft. Prior to the
Second World War one-third of the population was engaged in agriculture, compared
to 3 per cent today. Manufacturing now accounts for over half of the country's
income.
This once quiet farming society is now a highly industrialized
state with the world's highest level of per capita income. Guest workers from
Switzerland and Austria cross the border every day to staff the clean, high-tech
factories set discreetly in alpine landscapes. With prosperity has come confidence.
In keeping with its economic success, Liechtenstein began to assume an active
external role in the Council of Europe, the Organization of Security and Cooperation
in Europe and the United Nations. Perhaps most significantly, Liechtenstein became
a member of the European Free Trade Association and thus a full partner to the
negotiations which established the European Economic Area, now the architecture
of a new Europe. And, all of this with a population of 28,000!
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Or consider
the Isle of Man. With a population half the size of Prince Edward Island, it has
over the last two decades expanded its modest autonomy as a crown dependency of
the U.K. in order to build an independent strategy of development. Just like all
of the provinces in our region, the Isle of Man has known periods of depression,
the disappointment of unfulfilled hopes and expectations, and a pervasive sense
of helplessness in the face of decline. But the last twenty-five years have been
a time of recovery and vindication. In an innovative programme of public- and
private-sector collaboration and through a variety of fiscal legislative incentives,
the Isle of Man's economy has been transformed from a traditional dependence on
agriculture, the fishery and tourism to a cutting-edge and internationally competitive
economy in services and high-value, low-export cost manufacturing. Today the manufacturing
sector accounts for 17 per cent of the island's gross domestic product. There
are still difficult problems, particularly in a shattered tourist industry, but
Man is a story of jurisdictional recovery, and, if you like, jurisdictional chutzpah.
Of
course, small open economies risk penetration and undue influence in exchange
for the opportunities to target and cultivate niches where larger players may
not choose to play. But the manufacture of coatings for spacecraft in Liechtenstein
and the production of lenses for the cameras on those spacecraft in the Isle of
Man are striking examples of niche targeting. And for small economies, the returns
on such targeted niche development may be disproportionately beneficial precisely
because of the small size of the jurisdiction. These little places are like streetwise
youngsters always looking for opportunities in the comers of their neighbourhood
which bigger kids are likely to overlook.
So while the international market
may arrive on the shores of Prince Edward Island, there is no reason why Islanders
cannot learn to venture out into the world, as they are already doing in shipping
abroad their potato products. The point of all this is not to cling to unrealistic
dreams of autarky or exaggerated fantasies of independence. Economic integration
brings risks and constraints, just as it brings opportunities. But neither should
a pervasive sense of dependence lead Prince Edward Islanders to resign themselves
quietly to mergers and amalgamations. Arguments for such mergers can, in any event,
offer their own share of fantasy and unrealistic promise. What solid assurances,
after all, can unionists give that Maritime Union will improve our community’
and economy, or provide good government in an entirely untested new polity where
the notion of regional consciousness and membership has hardly begun to get off
the ground? Surely, there are many productive and challenging ways to promote
regional co-operation—to achieve economies and efficiencies through intelligent,
co-operative intergovernmental behaviour. But the pursuit of regionalism need
not go to the point of “collective suicide.”
Maritime Union: An Acadian Perspective
Although
Maritime Union has been a popular topic of discussion in the last few years, and
in particular since the recent Quebec referendum, the Acadian factor has rarely
been addressed in the debate. The intent in this presentation is to focus on this
crucial and possibly determining aspect of Maritime Union.
The success
or failure of Maritime Provinces integration could very well be determined by
the role played by the Acadian people in the decision-making. If the Acadians
are included as full-fledged partners in the integration process, the realization
of a Maritime political project will without doubt be much more feasible. On the
other hand, if they are excluded as they were when the Maritime provinces were
first created, this could prove to be a major stumbling block for the proponents
of Maritime Union.
Background
Before we look at the official
Acadian position on the possibility of Maritime integration, certain facts should
be emphasized in order to understand better their reasoning on this subject.
As
the first Europeans in 1605 to settle permanently what is now known as the Maritime
Provinces, the Acadians lived a mostly peaceful and prosperous life for over a
hundred years. It was during that period that the Acadian identity was forged.
Ironically,
it is believed that their independence and neutrality in the 18th-century
French-English
wars were the major factors that brought on the most significant events in their
history: Les Grande Derangements. The deportations of 1755 and later 1758 so marked
the Acadian people that some of the scars are still present today. But, in general,
the Acadian people have been able to overcome major obstacles over the years.
They are now considered important players in the economic and political future
of the Maritime Provinces, particularly in New Brunswick.
There are now
close to 300,000 French-speaking Acadians in the Maritimes. The vast majority
of them reside in New Brunswick. Through sheer determination and persistence they
have created solid institutions such as the Federation des Caisses Populaires
Acadiennes (over one billion dollars in assets), l’Assomption-Vie and l’Universite
de Moncton.
Although they face many challenges ahead. Maritime Acadians
have never been as strong and confident about their future. Their official position
on the possibility of Maritime Union certainly reflects that confidence.
Official Position
Ever since former New Brunswick Premier Louis Robichaud promoted
the idea in 1964, Acadians have been interested in the integration process of
the Maritime provinces. Until the early 1990s, particularly in New Brunswick,
Acadians were adamantly opposed to any type of integration. They feared having
their numbers diluted in a larger population. Acadians in New Brunswick now represent
roughly a third of that province's population. In a Maritime Union the total Acadian
population, including those in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia, would fall
to around 15 per cent of the total Maritime population.
In October 1992,
the Société Nationale de l’Acadie, a federation of major Acadian
groups, organized what has become an historic Forum on the Economic Integration
in Atlantic Canada. A majority of Acadians representing the economic sector displayed
unprecedented openness on this usually divisive subject. Clearly, Acadians felt
that the time had come to look objectively at this unfolding process and they
were ready to play an active role to ensure the continued development of the Acadian
society.
“In summary,” the Forum report states, “even though
the Acadian community of Atlantic Canada remains somewhat skeptical about future
benefits and vigilant about the impact on their development as an integral part
of Acadian people, that is, a French-speaking people, they are keeping the door
wide open to all opportunities for increased co-operation among themselves and
with the English-speaking community of Atlantic Canada.
“Though recognizing
the development of a partnership with authorities concerned and a collaboration
on an equal basis for the betterment of the entire Atlantic region as desirable,
they demand that their gains be protected and, in some cases, extended to all
of the Acadian communities.”
It is obvious that the Acadians have
moved from a position of strong opposition to that of a key player wanting to
take full advantage of the opportunities that the eventuality of Maritime integration
would bring.
Probable Scenario
Under what conditions could this official Acadian position translate into participation in the event of Maritime integration? First of all, Acadians will undoubtedly want a place at the negotiating table. Once at the table, the type of partnership to be negotiated with Anglophone communities will include certain stipulations, such as:
• Extending
Acadian rights guaranteed in New Brunswick to other Acadian communities in the
Maritimes;
• Granting some form of administrative autonomy to Acadian
regions;
• Ensuring linguistic duality in key provincial departments
such as education, health and economic development.
Conclusion
The
Acadian people's position on Maritime integration has evolved considerably in
the last few years. No longer will they accept the position of passive bystander
in a process that will fundamentally change their way of life.
For the
Acadian population, Maritime integration represents an underlying opportunity
to reunify the Acadian people for the first time in two hundred years. Let's remember
the Acadians were not asked -- nor did they want – to participate in the
creation of Maritime provinces where they did not even have the right to vote.
One cannot underestimate the strength of a people finally united by a common and
shared vision in which they are equal participating partners.
Maritime Union: A View From Another Island
For
Prince Edward Islanders to give up their existing autonomy in order to become
absorbed in an amalgamated Maritime or Atlantic Province would constitute a “folly-full”
act of historic proportions.
From a Cape Bretoner’s perspective—speaking
as one from an Island which has lost its autonomy—Prince Edward Islanders
would simply have to be “out of their minds” to consider such a move.
The
balloon recently flown by some Atlantic Liberal M.P.s (with the Prime Ministers
tacit urging, one wonders?) was a proposal to amalgamate the Maritime or Atlantic
Provinces (if Newfoundland was so willing). It was adroitly “pitched”
as a move toward Maritime Union -- thereby tapping into the traditional fondness
most Maritimers feel towards an autonomous Maritime Nation State.
I submit
that a significant motivation for the promotion of various amalgamations in vogue
across the country is to achieve a greater convenience for the promoters. For
the federal leadership, one Atlantic Province would take far less time to dispense
with than having to continue to deal with the current four pesky Premiers. The
claim that amalgamation would enhance the region’s autonomy is dubious and
flies in the face of history and experience.
In 1820, Cape Breton Island
was annexed to Nova Scotia and remains so in spite of years of protestation and
constitutional battles. Nowadays, to underscore the point, we resort to jokes—“Cape
Bretoners can't control themselves!” We are living proof of prolonged adolescence—the
teenagers of the Maritimes.
Isn’t the ultimate goal of democracy to
develop a society composed of informed, responsible and autonomous adults? That
goal has been clearly beyond our grasp from 1820 to the present.
Since
that time, and unlike Prince Edward Island, we have not been able to exercise
the constitutional and legal decision-making authority over such provincial jurisdictions
as health, education, transportation, cultural and social policy and, above all,
our resources.
Over the past 176 years, Cape Breton has been governed by
absentee managers. Our resources have been exploited and the significant capital
which our people have spent their lives to develop has been carted off to other
centres.
In 1967, when our cornerstone industries (coal, steel, forestry
and fishing) began to totter -- thanks in no small part to the kind of irresponsible
and careless management which absenteeism seems to engender -- the absentee owners
abandoned the Island.
When the federal and provincial governments of the
day stepped in to fill that breach (by establishing the steel and coal Crown Corporations),
they did so with much expressed benevolence and compassion. They then began to
kill us with their kindness.
Every conceivable Regional Development scheme
has been attempted on Cape Breton. Planners, consultants and professionals of
all kinds – people trained in universities using urban models -- consistently
failed to achieve sustainable development for an area which works on rural and
village based systems. The square peg wouldn’t fit in the damned hole and,
of course, to add insult to injury, somehow Cape Bretoners are responsible for
the lack of success.
Over the past few years, a new wrinkle has developed.
Now that the federal and provincial treasuries are empty, governments are telling
Cape Bretoners (who are without capital) that they have to be more entrepreneurial
and take charge of their future without, of course, granting us the constitutional
autonomy we would need to make that happen.
That's the kind of hypocrisy
that Prince Edward Island will face in an Amalgamated Maritime Province. Such
a province would likely see a greater centralization of power and services in
centres such as Halifax and Moncton. If you doubt that, look at the levels of
government services currently functioning in Cape Breton. In 1994, 3.1 per cent
of all cultural spending in Nova Scotia was spent in Cape Breton -- where 20 per
cent of the population resides. A quick glance at a government department phone
book will show similar or less numbers of employees living on the Island.
How
about another alternative? Given what's happening in the rest of the country,
maybe it's time to pursue a real Maritime Union -- an autonomous Maritime Nation
State, composed of constituent Provinces -- Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and -- yes -- the Province of Cape Breton Island.
Political and Economic Union in Atlantic Canada
The Atlantic Provinces Chamber of Commerce, the voice
of the business community in Atlantic Canada, has endorsed the necessity for a
stronger integrated economy involving political Union.
The Quebec referendum
was a wake-up call for all Canadians and especially for Atlantic Canadians. A
country which we take pride in almost fell apart, yet came together “from
Coast to Coast” in the last hours to stave off a vote which was destined
to have the province separate from the rest of Canada.
The idea of political
Union in the Maritimes, as many of you know, started well before our time in 1864
and got derailed in favour of a greater region, called the Confederation of Canada.
Later on, our Maritime region became Atlantic Canada when Newfoundland and Joey
Smallwood joined Confederation. The idea of political Union in our region makes
sense, but, while many are prepared to talk about it, few are willing to take
up the challenge and actually try to make it happen. The present structure of
the Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP) has done little since its inception in
1971 to foster economic co-operation and political Union. With the CMP and Newfoundland
we still have four sets of rules, regulations and systems which sometimes paralyze
business in our Atlantic region, with the likes of Workers’ Compensation,
sales tax, motor vehicle registrations, etc., being different in each province.
The
Atlantic Provinces Chamber of Commerce conducted a poll in the late fall of 1995
and the results were certainly stronger for political Union (76 per cent) than
we had ever anticipated. Our concern has been that the process towards economic
union and integration is not working in a way that benefits our region. Provinces
are doing their own economic development planning and competing against each other
to attract business. There are no strong signs of economic co-operation other
than at a superficial level. Yet our world, country and economy have changed,
creating new challenges for us to be economically stronger in our region if we
are to survive and compete in the global marketplace.
Our population base
of 2.5 million, less than one-tenth of all of Canada, produces $34-39 billion
GDP out of approximately $700 billion, which is only 5 per cent of the total Canadian
GDP. Forty per cent of our GDP is in transfer payments, making us quite reliant
on the federal government. What are our defences for shrinking transfer payments?
How do we deal with a federal government that is downloading responsibilities
for services like health, education and welfare, and, as a result, becoming a
weaker central government in doing so?
What are we trying to achieve? What
are our goals? I suggest that we should be:
a) maintaining the level of
prosperity to which we have become accustomed;
b) sustaining and increasing
job opportunities;
c) sustaining our essential social services;
d)
stabilizing our economic development within a renewed Canada.
Will political
Union make the region economically stronger? We believe it will take the forces
of both political and economic union to achieve our end result -- that of a stronger
economic region.
There are many fears that one voice will not be stronger
in Ottawa—especially since we now have four voices and especially when Ottawa
is becoming weaker and poorer. We may not be able to justify that this is the
case.
We certainly cannot say amalgamation is the “be all and the
end all,” when we see what has happened in recent municipal amalgamations.
One has to stop and think only for a moment to see that this has not been proven
to be a cost-effective, efficient approach. Governments tend to build bureaucracies,
raise salaries and provide for inefficiencies through regulations, acts and processes
that leave the whole system less effective than it was.
We maintain that
we are over-governed at all levels and certainly on a per capita basis. This is
where our region gets into serious difficulties with the rest of Canada, over
the level of transfer payments from the "have" provinces to the “have-nots.”
With 8.5 per cent of the population and 5 per cent of the GDP, it is obvious that
we must strengthen our economic position to become less reliant on transfer payments
in the future.
If we are to achieve our goals then we must be more aggressive,
and achieve higher levels of performance by pooling our resources in the four
Atlantic provinces. By doing this we strengthen our economic base and open doors
for new opportunities in the marketplace, begin to learn how to do business in
those new markets, and get a bigger bang for our buck, while creating jobs and
wealth in our region.
We are moving towards a more regional economy because
of the political changes where our fiscal realities will be more regional as a
result of the decentralization and changes in transfer payments.
I fully
believe we have to create a new economy in Atlantic Canada, whereby we use our
resources, become more aggressive, and make Atlantic Canada businesses more aware
of the older traditional maritime markets in New England and the Caribbean.
The
Atlantic Provinces Chamber of Commerce is providing a leadership role by looking
at initiatives such as the Pan Atlantic Conference in 1997 (North Atlantic Rim),
involving the four Atlantic provinces and the New England states, and creating
flexible business networks involving Canadian and offshore companies which will
be an economic benefit to our region.
In summary, Atlantic Union is essential
to building a stronger, more productive and self-sustaining regional economy.
We must maximize the economic development potential of the region, creating more
jobs and wealth in order to sustain the relatively high standard of living to
which we have become accustomed in recent years.
Maritime Political Union; An Overview of the Symposium
Until I moved to Prince
Edward Island in 1987, I thought that the idea of Maritime Union was a quaint
historical artifact, something that was seriously—if briefly—considered
before the people of this region came to their senses (some more slowly than others)
and joined Confederation (did I say that I moved here from Ontario?). Of course,
it took very little time for me to realize that the idea of Maritime Union plays
an important ongoing political role in this region. It is one of those good-sounding
ideas that comes to mind whenever economic or political turmoil occurs. In this
way, it is like the idea of free trade, a source of hope for salvation when dramatic
change seems called for.
Needless to say, saddled as I was by such an attitude,
I approached the symposium organized by the Institute of Island Studies and the
Institute of Public Administration of Canada with more than a little bit of skepticism.
However, it quickly became clear to me that for almost everyone in this room,
Maritime Union—both political and economic Union—has become a more serious
option in 1996 than it has been since the 1860s. The reason this idea was being
taken seriously by both its proponents and opponents, it seemed to me, had a lot
to do with the spirit of our age: the sense that we are going through a period
of almost unprecedented fundamental change in all aspects of society.
To
put the underlying mood and assumption bluntly, everyone who spoke at the symposium
today began from the premise that the status quo is not sustainable. Indeed, the
status quo is so far from being sustainable, most speakers implied, that any attempt
to sustain it would be dangerously counterproductive.
Three basic reasons
were given for believing that we cannot continue with our current political and
economic order in Atlantic Canada. These reasons are familiar to all Canadians.
First, the fiscal crisis of the Canadian state is undermining the ability of the
federal government to continue transferring large amounts of money to individuals
and governments in this region. Furthermore, that same fiscal crisis is undermining
the ideological, cultural, and political support for a strong federal government
that is capable of imposing and paying for national standards in social programs.
All of this adds up to a serious threat to the fiscal viability of governments
and government programs in Atlantic Canada.
The second reason for supposing
that dramatic change is necessary is closely related to the first: the crisis
of Canadian federalism is about to undermine the ability of the Canadian government
to support activities in this region. Indeed, faced the prospect of a sovereign
Quebec in the near future, the people of the Maritime provinces might have to
fend for themselves completely.
The third factor calling for dramatic change,
according to many speakers, is really a cluster of factors all relating to changes
in the economy. The argument was made (or, in some cases, assumed) that globalization
of markets the development of an information-based economy, and changes in the
nature of work amount to change on the order of the industrial revolution. Historically,
political systems have changed and adapted when the economy underwent such dramatic
changes. We need to prepare ourselves for a similar political restructuring.
This,
then, seemed to be what most Speakers at the symposium could agree upon: the crisis
we are facing are so great that this moment in political and economic history
is unlike any previous moment. Dramatic change is more likely now than at any
other time in recent history.
If everyone had agreed entirely, of course,
the day would not have been very interesting. Indeed if everyone agreed, we would
be well on our way to unify the three Maritime provinces. But there was vigorous
disagreement on we ought to react to the challenges facing us. At least four plans
were offered.
Economic cooperation: This plan came closest to preserving the status quo According to this approach, the existing governments in the region should continue to exist in roughly the same way they exist now, but they should work vigorously to expand their areas of economic co-operation, thus creating a single economy and securing the economic benefits of union without giving up the political advantages of remaining separate.
Political Union: This plan was presented forcefully. The argument went something like this. If we are to create an efficient economic unit that is capable of competing successfully in global markets and that is capable of supporting government without help from a national Robin Hood, we must break away from traditional attitudes and we must break out of traditional patterns of decision-making. The only way sufficiently to disrupt attitudes and established power structures is to unify the three Maritime provinces into a new single political unit. This would also have the effect of reducing the cost and inefficiency of government, which would be a benefit in itself.
Reduce the size, not the number of governments: In important ways, this argument is similar to the second one. Both arguments look to the freeing-up of market forces and entrepreneurial spirit to save the region. Both arguments see governments as obstacles to the good work of economic markets and entrepreneurism. However, this argument sees Maritime political Union as wasteful of time, energy and money. The barriers that have to be overcome on the way to political Union are so formidable that huge amounts of money will have to be diverted to overcoming them, and equally huge amounts of planning and thought will have to be devoted to political Union rather than to other, more pressing, problems. We should, the argument goes, continue with the same number of governments, but each of those governments should stop doing many of the things it currently does.
Political jurisdiction is a resource for economic and cultural development: Not only does this argument reject Maritime political Union, it positively embraces disunion. A look at small independent and nearly independent political units elsewhere in the North Atlantic suggests that a community’s control of political jurisdiction can be crucial to its economic strength and to the well-being of its citizens. Small communities elsewhere have used their control of legislative and executive powers to direct and encourage economic development. Furthermore, communities with strong unifying cultures, such as Cape Breton or Prince Edward Island, can use political independence as a means for cultural, as well as economic, development. From this perspective, the lack of Maritime political union is a blessing! In fact, we might want to dissolve some of the union that exists already, by setting Cape Breton on the path to independence. In the end, then, Maritime political union became only one of a number of alternatives available to the region. It remains a possibility, but not a necessity. Still, the idea of Maritime political union dominated the discussion and will continue to do so in the future. It is, after all, an idea rooted in a hope for a better future, an idea that spurs creative thinking and innovation. In the 1860s, people started from the idea of Maritime political union and ended up with Canada. In the 1990s, we might end up someplace equally exciting and rewarding.
Maritime Union: Revisiting An Impossible Dream
Older than Canada itself, Maritime
Union is an idea whose time has come... and gone ... and come ... and gone ...
and come yet again. Today as in the past, two main forces, both of them external
to the region, drive it. First, there is the fiscal agenda that now informs politics
in the rest of Canada, and which has led to a retreat by Ottawa from the affairs
of Canadian citizens and an anticipated major drop in transfer payments to Atlantic
Canada. Second, there is the looming threat of Quebec secession, which might result
in the dismemberment of the country, leaving its four easternmost provinces isolated
and adrift, cut off geographically, and perhaps even economically and politically,
from the richer regions of Canada. After all, though we speak of a Canada split
in two in the event Quebec attains sovereignty, in reality the four Atlantic provinces
constitute 11 per cent of the population, 6.5 cent of the land area, and 8 per
cent of the gross domestic product of a Canada without Quebec.1
The
1993 federal election, which all but extinguished the federal Progressive Conservatives,
is also a cause for concern. It totally altered the political landscape of the
country, with potentially disastrous effects in this region. There are now two
major parties in the House of Commons, Reform and the Bloc Québecois, with
no seats here; they represent, basically, western Canada and Quebec. Each, as
well, stands for programs which, if ever implemented, would pose a major threat
to the area. This, too, is part of the backdrop to the renewed calls for Union.
In
any case, the “downsizing” of government bureaucracies has led to a
“merger mania” across the country, as the quest for efficiency and “economies
of scale” becomes paramount. Small and relatively poor provinces outside
the Atlantic region have not been spared either: Manitoba and Saskatchewan have
been told by some to become “Saskatoba.”2 Proponents claim
such larger units would facilitate regional economic planning, save administrative
costs by eliminating the duplication that comes with competing layers of government,
streamline and combine departments, provide less costly delivery of services,
and lessen competition for jobs and investment. Prince Edward Island historian
Francis Bolger some two decades ago noted that “there has always been a desire
in central Canada to treat the three provinces as one,”3 and just
last year Prime Minister Jean Chretien remarked that an economic union of the
four Atlantic provinces might be “more efficient” and provide the region
with "a lot of advantages.”4
Is There a Maritime Political Culture?
Given their small size and proximity, and their distance
from the rest of English-speaking Canada, the Atlantic provinces are often considered
one Canadian region—even though only two were original partners in Confederation.
Certainly, they share many characteristics, including a coastal environment and
economic reliance on the sea; a depressed economic base and dependence on primary
industries, often seasonal in nature; dependency on federal contributions; high
unemployment and poverty; and large rates of out-migration and negligible immigration.
They also have a greater degree of interprovincial co-operation than any other
province in Canada.5 Yet, while Canadians often think of areas outside
their home province in regional terms, this rarely extends to those living within
those regions. Hence, while an Ontarian may refer to "the prairies"
or a British Columbian to “the Maritimes,” studies demonstrate that
within the region most people identify first with their own province. Regions
may be heuristic and analytical devices but provinces are concrete political realities
with institutions and bureaucracies; many groups have a vested interest in their
survival. Canadians engage in province-building, not region-building.6
Some
two decades ago J. Murray Beck stated categorically that these provinces “do
not constitute a region in any meaningful way” and could not be treated as
though they were “a political actor with an identifiable common consciousness.
He quoted Alex Campbell, a former premier of Prince Edward Island, who in 1977
had said that the only people who consider Atlantic Canada a region are those
who live outside Atlantic Canada: “We are four separate, competitive, jealous
and parochial provinces.”7
James Bickerton agrees that
Atlantic Canada is in some ways an artificial construct which obscures the distinct
political cultures of the four provinces; he does, however, suggest that Atlantic
Canadian regionalism is “a socio-political phenomenon that exists ... in
symbiosis with the federal government, its policies and programs.” Bickerton
points to manifestations such as the Maritime Rights movement of the 1920s to
demonstrate his point: since Confederation, the fortunes of Atlantic Canada have
tended to rise and fall together, most often as a result of actions taken in central
Canada, either by commercial and industrial interests or by the federal government.
Transfers from Ottawa and federal programs have bound the region as a collectivity
to Ottawa; the response from Atlantic Canada political elites when these are threatened
has therefore also often been collective.8 Robert Finbow notes that,
even though the provincial governments still sometimes “act as rivals for
limited economic prospects rather than as allies in a regional project of economic
renewal,” they do share a common economic vulnerability—and one which
would be greatly exacerbated should Quebec secede. In any event, he warns, “The
region of Canada least equipped to deal with the breakup of Confederation is Atlantic
Canada.”9
The History of “Maritime Union”
It
is, of course, well known to all students of Canadian history that the Maritime
provinces were, inadvertently, the catalyst for Confederation. When they agreed
to meet in Charlottetown in 1864, at the urging of Nova Scotia, it was to discuss
Maritime Union. Was Nova Scotia, in the words of Bolger, perhaps “yearning
for a restoration of the ancient boundaries she had enjoyed until Great Britain
detached Prince Edward Island in 1769, and New Brunswick in 1784?”10
In any event, the Maritimes exhibited little interest in the rest of British North
America. They were almost cut off from central Canada by the wilderness of northern
Maine and commercial relations were minimal; they faced the sea and traded mainly
with Britain and the United States. A suggestion made to Prince Edward Island
by the Governor General of Canada in 1859 to consider union, for example, had
been summarily rejected by the Island's Assembly. Only due to the continued urging
of British colonial authorities were delegates from what are now Ontario and Quebec
even allowed to participate in the meetings in Charlottetown.
When it came,
federation with the two Canadas was greeted with little enthusiasm by the citizenry
in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; in neither colony was there much regional consciousness
or loyalty to the new federal arrangement. Indeed, many were bitter and it seemed
as though anti-Confederation forces might prevail. In New Brunswick, an anti-Confederation
government was elected in 1865; in Nova Scotia, Joseph Howe led a movement for
secession almost immediately after his province had joined Canada. As for Prince
Edward Island, it had been lukewarm towards Maritime Union and rejected Confederation
altogether; the “Cradle of Confederation” only joined six years later,
due to financial problems, and under duress.
In the mid-1870s there were
some halfhearted attempts to revive Maritime union, initiated by New Brunswick
legislators, but they went nowhere. In 1879 the federal government instituted
the “National Policy,” a protectionist system of high tariffs on imports,
of benefit to central Canada; but this only exacerbated the economic problems
of the Maritimes, whose exports were hard hit by retaliatory American duties.
In 1886-1887, William S. Fielding’s Liberal government in Nova Scotia supported
a repeal movement which advocated the withdrawal of the three Maritime provinces
from Canada. While there was a widespread sense of grievance against central Canada,
the lack of regional consciousness -- indeed, suspicions in the other two provinces
that union would substitute the hegemony of Halifax for that of Ottawa -- prevented
secession.
In the twentieth century the centre of Canadian political gravity
shifted westward. Already a chronically depressed area which kept losing industry
to larger Canadian centres, the Maritimes, with little population growth, found
their political power greatly diminished. Would a union of the Maritime provinces
halt this loss of political power? In 1905, the Maritime Board of Trade passed
a resolution in favour of political union and the influential monthly periodical
Acadiensis ran a series of articles by Reginald Harris, a member of the board,
favouring Maritime Union. “Many political thinkers,” he informed his
readers, “are beginning to realize that the three provinces ... would be
to-day a far greater force in Federal politics and in the development of Canadian
nationality were they united and fighting shoulder to shoulder for what they are
justly entitled to as partners in the Confederation.” Harris advocated a
“legislative union” which would merge all power and authority exercised
by each province into one administration.11 It is remarkable how contemporary
many of his arguments seem: in one large province there would be economy of administration,
with a single legislature and bureaucracy instead of three; uniform executive,
judicial and taxation systems; economies of scale; greater revenues; obliteration
of those “sectional jealousies” and “petty discords” inherent
in small governments; a lessening of undue influence by local cliques, syndicates,
family compacts, and other vested interests; and increased self-reliance and influence
within Canada, to the benefit of the entire nation. Harris suggested the old historical
name “Acadia” for the new province and thought that Moncton, Sackville
or Amherst, all centrally located, might serve as the capital.12 The
premier of New Brunswick, John Douglas Hazen, did indeed in 1908 call for a “united
Acadia” to resist further loss of influence.
The First World War,
while not directly affecting the security of Canada, did, in the words of another
advocate of union, "re-open problems long supposed to have been settled."
John B. M. Baxter, a future premier of New Brunswick, proposed to the New Brunswick
legislature in 1917 a union of his province and Nova Scotia; in the March 1918
issue of The Busy East of Canada he remarked that social and political relations
were “in a state of flux” and thus a “re-alignment” would
be possible as soon as the war ended. Only a united province, he argued, could
develop such industry and commerce as would challenge the hegemony of central
Canada and attract immigrants to the region. Once the Maritimes were “clear
of the ruts of political tradition the wheels of progress would move at an accelerated
pace.”13 On the other hand, Joseph Read, an MP from the Island,
told the Halifax Commercial Club that Prince Edward Island had been "betrayed"
into joining Canada as the result of a “conspiracy” between the federal
government in Ottawa and the British authorities. So, while he favoured a Maritime
Union, he argued against a legislative amalgamation; the three provinces each
had the right to continued self-government. Read proposed, instead, a federated
province, a “Maritime Legislative League,” with an advisory assembly
composed of equal numbers of federal and provincial legislators from the three
provinces; the premiers would take turns as presiding officers. Each province
would retain its autonomy, while the new assembly would promote the common interests
of the three in matters of immigration, commerce, tourism and fishing, education,
public health and provincial rights.14
>>>top
A Maritime Rights movement,
demanding better terms for the region in Confederation, began to make significant
headway after the First World War and demonstrated the high level of discontent;
the Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King responded by forming a royal
commission on Maritime claims, called the Duncan Commission, which in 1926 accepted
some of the claims made by critics and suggested various remedies, including a
reduction in freight rates and increased subsidies to Maritime industries such
as coal and steel to offset the negative effects of high national tariffs. However,
it did not think the creation of a unified Maritime province would result in any
fiscal advantages.15
During the Depression, as today, many Canadians
felt the country was “over-governed” and advocated a reduction in the
number of political jurisdictions. The Guardian in 1935 expressed its anger with
certain Ontarians, including the editors of the Toronto Telegram, who “know
much better what is good for us than we do ourselves” and who had proposed
in an “offhand manner” that a province as small in area and population
as was Prince Edward Island be eliminated. The newspaper replied that Nevada had
the same population, and Delaware was the same size as Prince Edward Island, yet
“there is no agitation” for depriving them of statehood.16
The Mackenzie King government, in the meantime, appointed a Royal Commission on
Dominion-Provincial Relations, the Rowell-Sirois Commission, and once again the
issue of Maritime Union appeared on the agenda. But, readers of the Guardian were
assured, though it might remain "an issue of live interest in Central Canada,”
it had been “emphatically” rejected by premier Thane A. Campbell in
hearings before the Commission.17
The years immediately following
the Second World War saw a revival of Maritime Rights rhetoric. In 1948, George
Nowlan won a by-election to parliament from a Nova Scotia constituency on a platform
of Maritime Rights, and the following year the editor of the Maritime Advocate
and Busy East, successor to the Busy East of Canada, always an advocate of regional
union, called for a “united Atlantic front” to demand “Maritime
rights from Ottawa.”18 The addition of Newfoundland that year
also increased the relative importance of the region within Canada.
There
was also increasing co-ordination on the economic front. The Atlantic Provinces
Economic Council (APEC) had been founded in 1954 and in July 1956 the four premiers
met together for the first time, to forge a common strategy in fiscal negotiations
with Ottawa. Demands were made for federal aid and investment; a booming post-war
economy soon allowed Ottawa to begin its program of equalization payments. Provincial
governments could finally invest in infrastructure, including roads, educational
institutions and health care facilities, and living standards rose appreciably.
By
the mid-1960s, Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution” had unleashed the forces
of Quebec nationalism and there were fears the province might eventually choose
independence, isolating the Maritimes from Canada. New Brunswick premier Louis
Robichaud in 1964 began to wonder aloud whether the time had come to revive the
old idea of Atlantic Union; by 1968 he had convinced his fellow Maritime premiers
to sponsor an extensive Maritime Union Study, chaired by John Deutsch, to examine
the feasibility of greater regional co-operation and comprehensive planning. The
Deutsch Commission's report, published in October 1970, spoke of “the severe
difficulties for the nation which could result from ... Quebec separatism.”
Noting that by 1970 there were already some 181 active interprovincial organizations
in the region, it advocated greater Maritime co-operation; but it also recommended
the eventual attainment of full political Union, not merely administrative collaboration,
as a definite goal. Such political consolidation would reduce the cost of government
(Deutsch noted that there were 2 times as many civil servants per capita as in
the rest of Canada), provide the Maritimes with greater bargaining powers and
hence a better deal from Ottawa, and eliminate the counter-productive economic
competition which impeded sustained growth.19
All of this was
a bit too extreme for some political tastes, especially after Richard Hatfield
and Gerald Regan, who were less than enthusiastic about the Deutsch proposals,
defeated Robichaud and George Smith of Nova Scotia in provincial elections that
very October. Regan told an American journalist, “I am not convinced the
people of Nova Scotia are prepared to surrender the existence of this state,”
while Prince Edward Island premier Alex Campbell said his province would “lose
a good deal of the leverage we enjoy at present.”20 Hatfield said
that he would consider full Union only if such an enlarged province proved economically
viable.
The Maritime premiers did agree to work towards greater economic
integration, though, and the Council of Maritime Premiers was established on May
25, 1971, to improve communications and create a unity of purpose between their
governments; Hatfield hoped that the Council “could become one of the most
significant experiments in regional consultation and planning in Canada.”21
This was not to be. Though the Council would soon spawn various offspring, such
as the Higher Education Commission, established in 1974, and was provided with
a permanent secretariat and staff, no truly regional level of jurisdiction was
created. The Council was given no independent powers of taxation and its regional
activities were funded by the provinces themselves, out of their own budgets.
At
the end of the 1980s, economist Charles McMillan was hired by the Council to review
its work. Identifying “parochialism, a short term horizon, lack of vision,
institutional inadequacies and federal/provincial squabbling” as factors
impeding Maritime co-operation, he warned the premiers that they would have to
set aside their "old attitudes” and “partisan political concerns”
and work together to create a competitive economy. He suggested a common trade
promotion strategy to increase exports; the development of institutional links
with Quebec, New England, Scandinavia and the Pacific Rim; removal of internal
trade barriers; and creation of a Maritimes Savings Development Fund to pool investment
capital. Unlike Deutsch, McMillan was careful not to offend political elites in
the region and steered clear of advocating political Union; he stated bluntly
that it was “not a viable option for the region.”22 He continued,
in particular, to express doubts about the level of support for Union in Newfoundland
or Prince Edward Island.23
As the Meech Lake Accord came unravelled
in 1990, New Brunswick premier Frank McKenna, fearful that Quebec might leave
Confederation, proposed a common market among the three Maritime provinces that
would put an end to all Intel-provincial trade barriers.24 That seemed
moderate when compared to the statement made by Nova Scotia premier John Buchanan,
who in April of 1990 had concluded that in the event of Canada splitting apart,
union with the U.S. might prove the only realistic option.25 Buchanan’s
remarks created an uproar and he left office soon afterwards. McKenna's initiative,
on the other hand, was received favourably by politicians and business leaders
in the region, including Don Cameron, the new premier of Nova Scotia. Modeled
on the European Community, it proposed joint government purchasing, regulation
of motor vehicles, campaigns to promote tourism, some health care co-ordination,
a Maritime energy grid, and the portability of professional qualifications. Even
Newfoundland premier Clyde Wells began to express interest.26
Another
study published by the Council of Maritime Premiers in May 1991 identified continuing
barriers to economic integration and proposed various remedies, including more
employment mobility, the co-ordination of corporate registration, tax simplification
and transportation regulation The three premiers, meeting in March, had announced
that “the Maritime Provinces are too small to put up walls,” and the
study advocated greater co-operation among the provinces in agriculture, the fishery,
electric utilities and tourism. However, said the premiers, “political Union
could threaten the unique culture and identity of our citizens,” so the study
prefaced its recommendations by restating its belief in the “sovereignty”
of each province. The premiers, this time including Clyde Wells of Newfoundland,
again met in Moncton in June 1991; they agreed to provide, among other things,
a level playing field for Atlantic firms competing for government contracts or
bulk purchases, through the Atlantic Procurement Agreement, signed in 1992. Nova
Scotia premier Don Cameron remarked, “We’re dead serious about making
real change and being self-reliant.27
In 1992 the legislatures
of the three Maritime provinces passed the Maritime Economic Co-operation Act,
which formalized their commitments to a strategic program of economic co-operation,
including the building of a single Maritime market—it was shortly thereafter
extended to include Newfoundland. By 1994, work was in progress on some 65 projects
in 29 policy sectors, and private-sector groups were also taking steps to promote
regional co-operation.
Conclusion
A full 90 years ago, Reginald Harris declared Union to be so necessary that “neither old fogeydom nor officialdom nor jealousies can hinder it much longer. If the politicians are too light-weight to tackle the difficulties, they need not be surprised if the many take the matter into their own hands and settle the terms and fix the capital city, and do the other things that are necessary to promote the interests of this great country.”28 Union was, he wrote, “indispensable and an urgent necessity. Let us submerge petty jealousies and get to work.”29 Well, as we know, it didn’t happen. And while there has been substantial increase in economic co-operation and integration of services since the publication of the Deutsch report a quarter century ago, almost no progress has been made in moving forward towards political Union; Beck has referred to this blockage as “the supremacy of politics over economics in the Maritimes.”30 Perhaps Maritime Union will always remain a work in progress; Beck had himself contributed a volume for the Deutsch Commission, aptly titled The History of Maritime Union: A Study in Frustration, in which he had written that it would be essential “to demonstrate that substantial positive good- would result from Maritime Union, given “the wastage through ill will and conflict that will inevitably follow any attempt to effect it.”31 Still, as James Bickerton has noted, the combined effect of free trade, federal fiscal problems and continued cuts in services and fiscal transfers to the provinces, and the ongoing constitutional crisis, may force a rethinking of past32 patterns; contemplation of Union may finally be replaced with “concrete action leading towards its realization.”33 In the wake of the Quebec referendum of October 1995, the question of Maritime Union has definitely once again emerged, front and centre.
1.Robert A. Young. The Secession of Quebec
and the Future of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995),
Table A2, pp. 310-311.
2. Globe and Mail, Jan. 12, 1996, p. A21. (all references
to this newspaper’s national edition)
3.Guardian, Charlottetown, March
18, 1977, p. 1.
4.Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, June 29, 1995, pp. A1-A2.
5.
Rand-Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1991),
pp. 33-44; Roger Gibbins, Conflict & Unity: An Introduction to Canadian Political
Life, 3rd ed. (Toronto; Nelson Canada, 1994), pp. 154-155.
6. Gibbins,
pp. 188-189, cites a study which found that only six per cent of Atlantic Canadians
stated that they identified first with their region rather than with either their
region rather than with either their province or the nation.
7. J. Murray
Beck, “ An Atlantic Regional Political Culture: A Chimera,” in David
Jay Bercuson and Phillip A. Bruckner, eds., Eastern and Western Perspectives:
Papers form the Joint Atlantic Canada/Western Canadian Studies Conference (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp 147-148.
8. James Bickerton, “Creating
Atlantic Canada: Culture, Policy and Regionalism,” in Alain-G. Gagnon and
James P. Bickerton, eds., Canadian Politics: An introduction to the Discipline
(Peterborough, Ont: Broadview, 1990), pp. 325, 332-341.
9. Robert Finbow,
“Atlantic Canada: Forgotten Periphery in an Endangered Confederation?”
in Kenneth McRoberts, ed., Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1995), pp. 61-62.
10. Francis W.P. Bolger, “Nation
Building at Charlottetown, 1864,” in Francis W.P. Bolger, ed., Canada’s
Smallest Province: A History of P.E.I. ([Charlottetown]: The Prince Edward Island
1973 Centennial Commission, 1973), pp 137-138. In the 20th century, on the other
hand, New Brunswick has tented to take the lead in proposing union.
11.
Reginald V. Harris, “The Union of the Maritime Provinces,” Acadiensis
6, 3 (July 1906): pp. 172, 181.
12. Reginald V. Harris, “The Union
of Maritime Provinces, (Concluded),” Acadiensis 6, 4 (October 1906); pp.
247-254.
13. J.B.M. Baxter, “Maritime Union,” The Busy East of
Canada 8, 3 (March 1918): pp. 11-12.
14. Joseph Read, “The Question
of Maritime Union,” The Busy East of Canada 8, 8 (August 1918): pp. 5-8.
15.For
more on this protest movement, see Ernest R. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement,
1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1979). Arguments in favour of full Maritime union also continued to circulate.
See, for instance, Hance J. Logan, “Twenty-One Reasons for Maritime Union,”
The Busy East of Canada 18, 3 (March 1928):10, 12. Logan had also suggested that
if Maritime grievances could not be satisfied within Canada, than perhaps secession,
and the creation of a new British dominion, “ in close relationship”
with Newfoundland and the British West Indies, might be the answer. The Canadian
Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1926-27 (Toronto: Canadian Review Co., 1927),
p 360.
16. Guardian, Charlottetown, Nov. 18, 1935, p. 4.
17. Guardian,
Feb 12. 1938, pp. 1, 8.
18. Margaret Conrad, “The 1950s: The Decade
of Development,” in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise, eds., The Atlantic Provinces
in Confederation (Toronto and Fredericton: University of Toronto Press and Acadiensis
Press, 1993), pp. 402-403.
19.The Report on Maritime Union Commissioned
by the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island (Fredericton:
Maritime Union Study, October 1970), pp. 9, 55, 61-73.
20. New York Times,
Jan. 1, 1971, p. 6.
21. Toronto Star, May 27, 1972, p. 20.
22. Charles
J. McMillan, Standing Up to the Future: The Maritimes in the 1990s (Halifax: Council
of Maritime Premiers, December 1989), pp. 1-3, 43-46.
23.Chronicle-Herald,
Halifax, Oct. 28, 1991, p. A9.
24.Globe and Mail, June 4, 1990, pp. B1,
B4.
25. Toronto Star, April 19, 1990, p. A1.
26.McKenna stressed
that he was not advocating political union, given the “unique reality”
of linguistic duality in his province. Guardian, Charlottetown, Sept. 12, 1990.
27.Chronicle-Herald,
Halifax, March 26, 1991, p. A1; Globe and Mail, March 27, 1991, p. A19; May 24,
1991, p. A3; Challenges and Opportunity: A Discussion Paper on Maritime Economic
Intergration (Halifax: Council of Maritime Premiers, May 1991), pp. 2, 4-24; “Forging
Links to Economic Prosperity,” Commercial News, 70, 7 (July 1991); p. EP20;
Richard Starr, “Maritime Union,” New Federation 4, 2 (March/April 1994):
14; James Bickerton, “Waiting for the Future; Atlantic Canada After Meech
Lake,” in Frances Abele, ed., How Ottawa Spends: The Politics of Fragmentation
1991-92 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), pp. 147-158.
28. Harris,
“The Union of the Maritime Provinces,” p. 173.
29. Harris, “The
Union of the Maritime Provinces (Concluded),” p. 258.
30. J. Murray
Beck, “The Maritimes: A Region or Three Provinces?” in Transactions
of the Royal Society of Canada, Series IV, 15 (1977): 312.
31. J. Murray
Beck, The History of Maritime Union: A Study in Frustration (Fredericton: Maritime
Union Study, November 1969), p. 46.
32. Bickerton, “Waiting for the
Future,” p. 150.
33. Ibid.
Maritime Union: Is It Good for Prince Edward Island
The topic for debate this
evening is “Maritime Union: Is It Good for Prince Edward Island?" Prince
Edward Island has a long history of political autonomy. Prominent Island landowners
petitioned Great Britain for separation from Nova Scotia and, accordingly, status
as an independent colony was granted June 28, 1769. Islanders achieved Responsible
Government in 1851, resulting in an even more profound attachment to independence.
Maritime Union was first discussed seriously in 1864, with the motivation
coming from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. These two colonies wanted an intercolonial
railway, and reasoned that a united Maritime region would have more potential
clout.
At that time the two Canadas were experiencing constitutional problems
of their own, and when the politicians heard of the Maritime Union Conference,
they requested an invitation to attend. An invitation was extended and the eight-man
Canadian delegation, aboard the steamer Queen Victoria, arrived in Charlottetown.
The Canadians from Upper and Lower Canada, later Ontario and Quebec, under the
capable leadership of Sir John A. Macdonald, George E. Carter, George Brown and
others, were able to convince the Maritimers to set aside the idea of Maritime
Union for the proposed Union of all of the British North American colonies. From
that meeting, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island has the distinction of being
known as the “Birthplace of Confederation.”
Initially, Prince
Edward Island saw no advantage to this union. The Island was experiencing a period
of uninterrupted political growth and economic expansion. The population was doubling
every thirty years and the revenues every twelve years. There was little debt,
and Islanders felt very confident about their future prosperity.
The period
from 1830-1880 is often referred to as the Golden Age of Sail. During that period,
over 2,500 vessels were built on the Island, the largest being the Ethel, a three-decker
of 1,795 tons.
The shipment of produce to the New England States brought
prosperity to the Island. However, times were changing. The Reciprocity Treaty
of 1854 which had been so favourable in terms of trade with the United States,
was revoked in 1866. The result was economic hardship for the people of Prince
Edward Island.
For Islanders, union with Canada now became a viable option.
The building of the Island railroad had put the province deeply in debt, the question
of transportation to the mainland needed to be addressed, and the absentee landlord
situation was a burning issue. In 1873, albeit reluctantly, the Island joined
Confederation.
Ever since July 23, 1767, when the whole of the Island,
comprising 67 lots or townships, was given away in London to prominent individuals
from the military, business, and gentry classes, ownership of the land for Islanders
has had special significance.
It has been said we are not only makers of
history, we are made by history. Islanders’ love for and association with
the land have been shaped by the struggle to gain title to their leased land.
Leases of 999-year duration would be granted to the tenant farmers, but freehold
titles were generally denied. Rents were paid by the farmers for generations.
On a personal note, the Reid Century Farm was settled in 1837, the proprietor
being J.C. Pope. In 1874 the Reid family finally was able to get legal tide to
the land. My husband, Lea Reid, is a great-great-grandson of the original settler,
John Reid. When the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was being drafted,
strong Island representation ensured that property rights were enshrined in the
Charter.
Most Islanders recognize that people and land are our two most
valuable resources. Agriculture is our main industry and good land management
is of great concern to the farming community. Soil erosion and overcropping are
problems that must be addressed. The production of food and control of the land
by multinational corporations are pressing problems that require strong leadership
if Islanders are to pass on to future generations a heritage of good stewardship
of one of our greatest resources. We won't have a society if we destroy our environment.
As
one of ten equal partners in Confederation, the Island has a rightful share in
Canada's resources. Our provincial autonomy gives Islanders the power to legislate
and control our resources. Regional disparities do exist and national policies
have attempted to address the problem. Granted, Prince Edward Island is small
in size, material wealth and political influence, but these factors should not
be everything in a federal state. If they are, then the federal system will have
failed.
Would Maritime Union save money in the governance of the region?
This is debatable, since in any new political union, as with any new institution,
new layers of bureaucracy tend to be needed to implement new legislation, etc.
Increased economic union, however, is practical, and savings could be
realized in the areas of education, health, technology and goods and revenues.
A formal economic agreement ratified by the three provinces would, I believe,
be very cost-effective.
Canada is a land large enough for everyone to build
their dreams, and a land generous enough to let others build the dreams they want.
We are one of the equal partners in the greatest country in the world. As an Island
people we are facing challenging times; we can best meet that challenge by retaining
our autonomy and charting our own future.
The
Maritimes: Our Future Together
Thank you for the invitation to participate
in this important seminar on the topic of “Maritime Union: Is It a Good Idea
for PEI?”
The idea of preparing for the future by studying and understanding
what is appearing around us is my introductory theme this evening. My second theme
is that the status quo is not an option for our future into the next century.
And my concluding theme is that the factors influencing our future dictate a thoughtful
consideration of broad strategies for coping with them. What are the trends shaping
our future? Important to understanding our future are the economic and political
factors causing the Maritime provinces to rethink our relationships with one another,
with Canada and with the world:
1. the federal government's diminishing
capacity to fund Equalization, Established Programs Financing, transfers for highway
construction, regional economic development and social assistance — in a
region which historically relies tremendously on public spending and public sector
jobs;
2. our younger and our more productive people moving out of the region, leaving too few of us behind to support the level of public services; and
3. continuing constitutional uncertainty surrounding the future of Quebec in Canada.
These
factors strengthen my conviction that the status quo is not an option for the
Maritime provinces and is my second theme this evening.
Let's look at
federal spending in Atlantic Canada as a per cent of the Gross National Product.
In Atlantic Canada it is 42.7 per cent. In Canada as a whole it is about one-half
of Atlantic Canada's at 23.5 per cent.
In terms of federal employment
as a percentage of total employment, in Atlantic Canada 7.7 per cent of the labour
force is employed by the federal government while in Canada 4.1 per cent of the
labour force works for the federal government. It is this continuing dependence
on federal spending, when the stark reality is that the rest of the country can
no longer afford to pay our bills, that deepens my resolve that the status quo
is not an option for our future together in the Maritimes.
This brings
me to my third theme — which is that the factors influencing our future dictate
broad strategies for coping with them. I would argue that the starting point for
developing these strategies should be thinking through the way our region is governed.
As the federal government reduces program spending and devolves powers, are our
region's governing institutions capable of effectively managing the challenges?
In terms of providing education, health care and transportation services, for
example, are the Maritime Provinces duplicating efforts, increasing costs while
reducing the effectiveness of our public officials to manage these inevitable
challenges?
Although evolving economic co-operation is a step in the right
direction toward regional self-sufficiency, it raises fundamental concerns.
For
years, the Council of Maritime Premiers has been talking a good line on integrating
the region's economy, and, indeed, to the Premiers' credit some progress has been
made. However, it has been a painfully slow and inefficient process.
I
know from my own experience in dealing with regional social issues that the inescapable
reality is that when you have three or four governments at the table — and
merely getting them to the table can often be a feat — more often than not,
the end result is the lowest common denominator that they can all agree on.
And,
in fact, New Brunswick's Premier McKenna has recognized this dilemma in his recent
statements, where he has, on the one hand, talked hopefully about economic integration,
and, on the other, has been candid about its limitations.
Political union
may or may not be the answer. Obviously, achieving it would not be easy. But it
is an option that must be thought through.
One Maritime province has a
certain logic. It would be larger and more economically powerful than any single
province, and its future economic development prospects would be greatly enhanced
because it would be driven by a single economic development strategy. As well,
one larger stronger province would have more influence in national policy making
and would better represent the region's common interests and its unique character
than three competing small provinces.
A vital consideration in any strategy
for our future "governance" is that it must both protect and enhance
the cultural and linguistic characteristics of our Acadian population. And it
must ensure that the unique lifestyle of our individual communities, such as we
find, for example, in Cape Breton and, indeed, right here on Prince Edward Island,
are encouraged to flourish and prosper.
That is why Maritimers must be
involved in defining our future together. But that future must be an informed
one based on informed debate. We have to study carefully all aspects of our future
“governance,” but at the end of the day it will be the people of the
Maritimes, not the politicians or economists or lobbyists, who must decide what
option will be in their best interest and in the best interest of future generations.
We
are all in this together; the pressure is on. Our people must not be held hostage
to a false vision of our future. We will not be doing ourselves a favour by avoiding
the tough thinking that is required now. What form of governance best reflects
the unique character of our region? What approach to governance would most Maritimers
feel comfortable with? How do we achieve real self-sufficiency? How do we protect
our values while increasing our prosperity that will result in our region becoming
a stronger partner in our confederation? The future has overtaken us. We must
urgently come to grips with the necessity of a distinctly different Maritime region
in the Canada of the 21st century.
Rethinking
Maritime Union: The Third Alternative
As Dr. John Crossley, Vice-President
of the University of Prince Edward Island, outlined in his summary of the daytime
discussions which focussed on the whether Maritime Union is a good idea for Prince
Edward Island, the choices before us seem to be the status quo, Maritime Union
and what I call the Third Alternative. We all seem to be in agreement that the
status quo is not a viable alternative. I also reject the option of Maritime Union
for many of the reasons mentioned earlier today. More importantly, I believe the
Maritime Union choice indicates an unwillingness on our part to face a new bolder
option — the Third Alternative.
I am compelled by the Milne/Bartmann
presentation on the possibilities that may emerge from the study of other North
Atlantic Islands, such as Iceland and the Isle of Man. I have been involved on
the periphery of this work and had the great experience of visiting Iceland. I
was truly impressed. I recall that when I arrived in Iceland I wanted immediately
to discover what made up “the great plan.” What combination of programs,
policies, institutions and infrastructure came together to allow this sparsely
populated island with limited resources to achieve such remarkable economic and
social success? At first I was afraid that maybe Prince Edward Island would have
to become a state independent from Canada to achieve the same results. This, thankfully,
is not the case.
There is a lesson to be learned from both Iceland and
the Isle of Man. I quickly concluded, without any great depth of research, that
the secret of their successes did not lie in any unique economic plan or institutions.
Although differences do exist in these areas and lessons can be learned, I believe
the bigger lesson lies within the minds and hearts of the people.
I discovered
that there is an attitude and a belief among these island people that it is their
destiny to survive as an economically self-reliant entity. They have the same
challenges as the rest of us with globalization and increasing competition, yet
there never seems to be a thought given to turning to someone else to solve the
problem. This condition exists as a nation, as communities, and as individuals.
Closely
associated with this attitude is some kind of anchor or common identity which
ties the collective community together. In Iceland, this anchor would seem to
be literacy. Iceland takes great pride in its high rate of literacy, which extends
back into its early history. This perception of mine may or may not be true. The
real issue is that in some way the Icelandic people have forged an identity which
translates into economic success. I believe a similar situation exists in the
Isle of Man. In both cases the path they have chosen is not the easy road. In
both cases there was a price to pay. In their recent history, they have had to
resist the temptation to "plug in" and pay the price of making it on
their own.
I believe that on Prince Edward Island our anchor is the land.
We are all aware of our history with the "Land Question" and how our
courage and determination in facing that issue coincided with a period of prosperity
prior to Confederation. It seems to me that our path to facing the future lies
first in rediscovering ourselves as Islanders. If we can reconnect with our souls
as a people, then we have taken the first step towards self-reliance. As my colleague,
the Hon. Marion Reid, suggested, we have a spirit that brings us together and
in the past we have demonstrated our ability to be self-reliant.
Therefore,
I reject the option of Maritime Union. As was pointed out today, the promise of
increased efficiency and greater power in Ottawa are hollow objects. They are
old ideas based upon old notions of economic thinking. They represent the worst
kind of incrementalism. Large corporations and governments are going through processes
called reform, re-engineering and so on. Inevitably we seem to follow the same
evolution. At first we downsize, delayer, centralize and amalgamate. At first,
we enjoy some increased efficiency from this exercise but quickly discover that
we are still not competitive and are doing things the same old way — only
with new names on the boxes. Then quite often the next step is to remove the top
executives. We have seen this in a number of major corporations. For the few that
keep going, they finally realize that the old patterns and assumptions about business
and management will not work. The company is faced with completely redefining
itself in a new way.
I believe the same situation faces us on the Island.
Maritime Union is an old idea based on old assumptions. Prince Edward Island is
a province with all the powers and privileges of any province in Canada. Could
it be that we have failed to use our powers over education, justice, direct taxation,
etc., to our best possible advantage? Furthermore, within the context of renewed
federalism, this challenge is before the federal government as well; we cannot
create a condition of self-reliance on our own. Will the federal government be
up to the challenge?
Will they, along with some of their most closely allied
power structures in Upper Canada, be able to let go and allow us to create our
own self-sustaining economy? The details could make up another debate.
I believe our best chance is to reconnect with our spirit as an Island people
and use all our resources, including our powers as a province, to face the challenge
of future.
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© Institute of Island Studies, 1996
Institute of Island Studies